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Designing a 
Voluntary Beef Checkoff 
F. Bailey Norwood, Chris Winn, 
Chanjin Chung, and Clement E. Ward 
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the mandatory fees imposed 
by  the beef checkoff violates the First Amendment. As a precaution, many states 
began forming voluntary beef checkoffs, where funds would be raised through volun- 
tary contributions. This study conducted a survey of  Oklahoma cattle producers to 
determine what type ofvoluntary checkoff design would receive the greatest support. 
The most popular checkoff placed a large emphasis on advertising and a slightly 
lower checkoff fee. The survey also tested the ability of a provision point mechanism 
to limit free-riding. The mechanism was not as effective as in other studies which 
used laboratory experiments. 
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Introduction 
The beef checkoff began in 1986,  when a majority of cattlemen voted in favor of the Beef 
Promotion and Research Act. The checkoff is managed by the Cattlemen's Beef Promo- 
tion and Research Board, commonly referred to as the Beef Board. Checkoff funds are 
raised by assessing all U.S. cattle producers a mandatory fee of $1  for each head of cattle 
sold. A $1 per head-equivalent fee is placed on all imported cattle and beef imports as 
well. Since its inception, the checkoff has sought to improve beef demand through 
research, advertising and promotion, consumer information, industry information, 
foreign marketing, and producer communications.' 
The legality of the beef checkoff has been frequently challenged in courts, but prior 
to 1998, posed little threat to the checkoff. These challenges include the 1989 United 
States v.  Frame and the 1998 United States v.  Goetz cases. Later, the U.S. Supreme 
Court provided beef checkoff opponents with an opportunity when it  ruled the mushroom 
order unconstitutional in 2001 on the grounds that it  violated free speech. Consequently, 
the Livestock Marketing Association and the Campaign for Family Farms challenged 
the  beef checkoff on similar grounds. On June 21,2002, a federal judge in South Dakota 
ruled the beef checkoff unconstitutional, and this ruling was later upheld by the 8th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Unless these rulings were appealed, the only way the 
beef checkoff could continue its activities would be to raise funds through voluntary 
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contributions. To maintain the checkoffs mandatory nature, an appeal was made to the 
Supreme Court, where checkoff proponents argued the checkoff did not violate the First 
Amendment because it constituted government speech (Smith, 2003a,b, 2004). 
Meanwhile, 17 states developed contingency plans for a voluntary checkoff as the 
Supreme Court deliberated (Barrett, 2004). Oklahoma passed a bill that would allow 
creation of  a voluntary beef checkoff where all producers are assessed a checkoff fee- 
just as  they are  now-but  their fees would be refunded if requested within 45 days. Both 
Texas and Tennessee passed similar legislation (Barnett, 2003; Delta Farm Press, 2004). 
If state-level checkoffs sought to conduct large-scale advertising campaigns, due to the 
high cost of television ads, they would likely want to pool their resources. Currently, for 
every dollar collected by  the checkoff, $0.50  is returned to the state where it was 
collected. An organization called the Federation of State Beef Councils could then pool 
these funds for large-scale projects. If this federation was maintained under a voluntary 
checkoff, it could coordinate state-level funding in a way that mimics a nationwide 
voluntary checkoff. 
After months of anxious waiting by interested parties, the Supreme Court announced 
the beef checkoff did indeed reflect government speech, and therefore did not violate the 
First Amendment (Smith, 2005). A ruling against the checkoff would have been unfor- 
tunate for the 70% of beef producers who support the checkoff. Approximately 80% of 
producers believe the checkoff increases retail beef demand and increases profits at  the 
farm level, and 60% believe beef demand would decline if the checkoff was eliminated 
(High Plains Journal,  2004; Smith, 2003a). For now, it appears the beef checkoff  is safe. 
However, checkoff opponents will likely continue to attack the mandatory nature of the 
beef checkoff, and while it is unknown whether these attempts will be successful, it is 
constructive to look back and question whether the checkoff could have survived on a 
voluntary basis, and what could have helped the checkoff survive. 
Between the time checkoff supporters filed an  appeal with the Supreme Court and the 
time the appeal was officially ruled upon, we conducted a survey of Oklahoma cattlemen 
to gauge their attitudes toward a voluntary checkoff. The type of voluntary checkoff con- 
sidered mimicked the voluntary checkoff being developed by the Oklahoma legislature. 
Each cattle producer would be assessed a fee for each head of cattle sold,  just as  they are 
now, but this fee would be refunded if requested. These voluntary fees would then be 
used to fund advertising, research, and other activities just like the current checkoff. 
Both a state- and a national-level voluntary checkoff were considered. 
The survey was designed to answer three questions: (a)  What level of voluntary fee 
per head of cattle sold and what budget allocation do cattle producers prefer? (b)  Could 
a provision point mechanism limit free-riding? and (c)  What participation rate can be 
expected from a voluntary checkoff! The answers to these questions are important 
despite the fact that the Courts ruled in favor of  the checkoff. The first question, 
concerning preferences for checkoff design, partially dealt with how cattle producers feel 
checkoff funds should be spent across advertising, research, and other activities. This 
information can be used by checkoff administrators to tailor the current checkoff budget 
in accordance with their constituents' preferences. Also, future attempts at  removing the 
mandatory nature of the beef checkoff may be successful. If this occurs, then the survey 
results provided here will be of immediate guidance in how a voluntary checkoff should 
be designed, how voluntary fees should be assessed, and what type of participation rate 
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Finally, the free-rider problem is a recurring issue in public-good provision, and econ- 
omists should seek effective tools for limiting free-riding. Mechanisms exist which can 
alter one's dominant strategy away from free-riding. One example is a provision point 
mechanism, where all contributions are refunded if a specific level of  support is not 
reached. These refunds are made to all individuals, regardless of whether they requested 
it. Provision point mechanisms can be specified as  a specific amount of money that must 
be generated or a percentage of producers who donate. In the past, checkoffs have been 
evaluated based on a referendum, where each producer gets one vote. It  then stands to 
reason that if a provision point mechanism is used, it will be specified as a minimum 
percentage of producers who donate-a  threshold level ofprovision (TLPX2 
Provision point mechanisms alter an individual's dominant strategy in noncooper- 
ative games, and in some instances can achieve a social optimum allocation of public 
goods through donations (Bagnoli and Lipman, 198913  Experiments have also concluded 
that provision point mechanisms increase voluntary contributions and the probability 
of funding a public good (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Messer, Kaiser, and Schulze, 
2004; Messer, Schmidt, and Kaiser, 2005; Poe et al., 2002). The 2004 study by Messer, 
Kaiser, and Schulze is especially relevant because its lab experiment was designed to 
mimic a voluntary checkoff. The authors found a TLP of 70% was met in more than 90% 
of trials. Messer, Schmidt, and Kaiser (2005) provided even more innovative experiments 
in a study aimed at  identifying the optimal TLP in a checkoff setting. Under certain set- 
tings, the optimal TLP is around 80% and is met 76% of the time, supporting the notion 
that voluntary checkoff managers should consider TLPs when designing checkoffs. 
However, implementing a TLP introduces risk. If a TLP is not met, the checkoff board 
must refund all fees, losing momentum and expected contributions in future years. This 
risk is greatest when the benefit-cost ratio for public goods is low (Rondeau, Poe, and 
Schulze, 1999). The prospect of  issuing full refunds is too risky to warrant the use of 
TLPs based on laboratory experiments alone. It  would be prudent to also measure cattle 
producers' reaction to TLPs through surveys. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, a description of the survey 
is presented. The next section estimates a random utility model describing Oklahoma 
cattle producers' preferences for a voluntary beef checkoff. The effectiveness of the  provi- 
sion point mechanism is then examined, followed by a section predicting donation rates 
in a voluntary beef checkoff. The concluding section provides a summary discussion and 
final comments. 
Survey Description 
In the beginning of January 2004, a total of  2,950 surveys were mailed to Oklahoma 
cattle producers, yielding 670 usable surveys. Eighty-three surveys were returned due 
to undeliverable addresses, giving a final response rate of 23%. The mailing list was a 
A case in point is when acclaimed author Stephen King attempted to provide his novel The Plant directly to readers over 
the internet. Readers were told they would receive monthly installments of the book to download, and were asked to volun- 
tarily contribute $1 per month for the installment. To limit free-riders,  King warned readers that if fewer than 75%  of readers 
made the voluntary payment, the offer would cease. By the last chapter, only 46%  of readers made the voluntary payment 
(Wheeler, 2002). 
Provision points only create a second, dominant set of Nash equilibria when the benefit-cost  ratio of the public good is 
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stratified random sample obtained through the National Agricultural Statistics Service 
database. The survey was pre-tested through mailing of  draft surveys to 15 Oklahoma 
cattle producers, as well as students who manage cattle, and colleagues. A reminder 
notice was mailed two weeks after the initial survey mailing. A sample survey is pre- 
sented in the appendix. 
The survey provided a brief description of the beef checkoff program and the recent 
court rulings concerning the program. Next, through the use of  choice experiments 
(often referred to as conjoint analysis), respondents were asked what type of voluntary 
program they would support, should the mandatory program be ruled unconstitutional. 
A hypothetical voluntary checkoff program was described, similar to the refundable 
checkoffs being prepared in Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas. Producers were told 
checkoff fees would be collected as  a fee per head sold,  just as  they are now. If they wish, 
producers could then request their checkoff fees be refunded in full. Remaining funds 
would then be spent on checkoff programs. However, if a threshold level of  provision is 
not met, all fees would be refunded, even if a refund was not requested. 
Next, producers were presented with two hypothetical checkoffs that differed in the 
checkoff fee, threshold level of provision, and the allocation of funds across advertising, 
research, and other activities. Producers were asked to which checkoff they would most 
prefer to donate. If they would not donate to either checkoff, they could indicate they 
would request a refund. Producers were asked to make this choice both if the checkoff 
was a national program and a state program. By varying the fee, threshold level of pro- 
vision, and funding allocation across surveys, a random utility model can be estimated 
to predict donations to a national- and state-level voluntary beef checkoff. 
At the national level, the beef checkoff budget allocation was 53% advertising and 
promotion, 10% research, and 37% other in 2004 (Smith, 2003b). The "other" category 
includes export promotion and consumer education, among other activities. In  the choice 
experiment for the nationwide checkoff, producers were given an  option between donating 
to two hypothetical checkoffs and an option not to donate. In all surveys, the percentage 
of funds spent on promotion, research, and other in one of the hypothetical nationwide 
checkoffs is allocated according to the current budget mentioned above, and the alter- 
native nationwide checkoff contains a different budget randomly generated to ensure 
the percentages sum to one. A similar question was posed for state-level checkoffs, but 
the budget allocations for both hypothetical checkoffs were randomly generated. The 
state-level checkoff question was always preceded by the nationwide checkoff question, 
so an ordering effect may be present. The range of values for the voluntary fee, budget 
allocation, and the threshold level of provision were randomly chosen for each survey 
and survey question (see table 1)  to maximize the  D-efficiency score, which ensures both 
balanced and orthogonal attributes within and across  survey^.^ 
Evidence suggests producers will more willingly commit to a hypothetical checkoff 
than a real checkoff where a monetary payment is made. This is referred to as hypo- 
thetical bias, and is pervasive in stated preference studies (List and Gallet, 2001). 
Hypothetical values are calibrated downward based on individuals' expressed uncertainty 
'Attributes are randomly chosen such that they are within the bounds in table 1. The budget allocation is chosen whereby 
the mean percentage allocation is approximately 33% and all budget allocation percentages sum to  one. Given these 
constraints, attributes are then randomly  chosen across  and within surveys iteratively, until thevalue of I (XX).'  I '"is max- 
imized (X  is the vector of explanatory variables and Pis  the number of explanatory variables). The measure I (X'X).' I  'IP  is 
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Table 1. Value of Checkoff Attributes Across Surveys 
Checkoff Attribute  Average  Minimum  Maximum 
Checkoff Fee (FEE)  $l.OO/head sold  $0.2O/head sold  $2.OO/head sold 
Percent of Funds Spent on:  .  Advertising (ADV)  33%  10%  85%  .  Research (RES)  33%  0%  75%  .  Other (OTHER)  33%  5%  80% 
Threshold Level of Provision (TLP)  50%  5%  90% 
Note: For the nationwide checkoff, one of the hypothetical checkoffs budget allocation was set to equal the current 
allocation.  This checkoff was not included in these summary statistics. All checkoff fees and percentages change in $0.05 
and 5% increments, respectively. The attributes are chosen from a uniform distribution, with consideration that the 
budget constraint must sum to 100%. 
about how they would behave if the checkoff were real. If a producer responds she would 
contribute to a checkoff by not requesting a donation, we asked her to answer a 
certainty question similar to that used by  Champ and Bishop (2001). This question 
states, "On a scale of  1  to 10, where 1  means "very uncertain" and 10 means "very 
certain," how certain are you that you would voluntarily pay the checkoff fee for the 
option you chose in Question 1  if given the opportunity?" If the subject indicated a 
certainty level less than eight, her survey answer was changed to "no donation." This 
calibration strategy using the eight-threshold is referred to here as a certainty- 
calibration. 
Champ and Bishop  (2001) found that the certainty-calibration (using an eight- 
threshold) eliminated hypothetical bias in a study of willingness to pay for wind energy. 
Similar results have been reported in other studies (Blumenschein et al., 1998;  Vossler 
et  al., 2003). More recent studies  have illustrated a definite link between answers to the 
certainty question and hypothetical bias (Johannesson et  al., 1999), indicating that the 
certainty-calibration is not an arbitrary method of decreasing hypothetical values. In 
all studies comparing values using the certainty-calibration to true values, the certainty- 
calibration either provides unbiased estimates of true donations or under-predicts true 
donations (Johannesson et al., 1999; Blumenschein et al., 1998; Champ and Bishop, 
2001; Poe et al., 2002). Each of  these studies evaluated the certainty-calibration in a 
dichotomous choice setting. 
However, a recent study by Norwood (2005) shows previous results regarding the 
certainty-calibration also extend to conjoint analysis involving public goods. Norwood 
mimicked a voluntary beef checkoff in an experimental setting, where students could 
voluntarily contribute toward a public good. Just like the survey in this study, the 
donation could be a fured amount, was voluntary, and involved a threshold level of 
provision. Before contributions could be made, subjects were administered a conjoint 
analysis survey containing a certainty-calibration.  The survey results were then used to 
predict donation rates  to the  public good. Consistent with previous studies, uncalibrated 
survey responses over-predicted participation, while use of  the certainty-calibration 
under-predicted participation rates. Since uncalibrated models should over-predict true 
donation rates due to hypothetical bias, the use of calibrated and uncalibrated models 
should provide a lower and upper bound to the true  willingness to donate to a voluntary 
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It is worth noting our survey followed a year of  record-setting high cattle prices. 
These high prices survived the discovery of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in 
the United States, partly due to limited supplies and partly due to the growing popular- 
ity of high-protein diets. These events prior to the survey point to producer optimism, 
which may imply a greater willingness to support checkoff programs than in more 
pessimistic times. 
Most of the respondents were involved with both cow-calf (77% of respondents) and 
stocker production (68%),  while 28% indicated they had sold fed-cattle, 7% had sold veal 
cattle, and 21% had sold purebred cattle. Analysis of  the survey responses suggests 
preferences for a voluntary checkoff differ little across farm type and sizes (Winn, 2004). 
For the remainder of this paper, all producers are assumed to have identical preferences 
for a voluntary checkoff, regardless of the farm type they operate or the number of cattle 
they sell. 
Producer Preferences 
for a Voluntary Checkoff 
Survey responses described previously are used to estimate a random utility model for 
a voluntary checkoff. Utility is specified to be a function of the checkoff attributes. Attri- 
butes include the voluntary fee per head of cattle sold (FEE  ); percentage of contributions 
spent on advertising (ADV),  research (RES), and other (OTHER); and threshold level 
of provision (TLP). First, a simple linear random utility model is used to determine 
whether responses to the national-level and state-level checkoffs can be  pooled  to 
estimate a single utility model for both checkoff types. Pooling of  data is possible if 
producers' willingness to donate toward a checkoff and preferences for how the checkoff 
dollars are spent do not depend on whether it is an  Oklahoma checkoff or a nationwide 
checkoff. 
The ability to pool data is determined by first estimating the random utility function: 
where x,  = [FEE,  ADV, RES, OTHER, TLPiI, Si  is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
checkoff is at  the state level and zero otherwise, and the Pi's are conformable parameter 
vectors. The Si  variable switches utility from representing a state checkoff when Si = 1 
to a nationwide checkoff when Si  = 0. The term E, is assumed distributed according to the 
extreme-value distribution. There is no intercept, and all explanatory values are set to 
zero when "no checkoff' is ~hosen.~  This sets utility from not donating equal to the error 
term ei. 
Since the extreme-value distribution has  a fured variance, the estimates of the Pi's are 
partly a product of  the utility variance. Mathematically, the estimate of  Pi equals the 
true value times a scale factor, Di  = Pi&,  where & is the true utility parameter and  is 
a scale factor (Swait and Louviere, 1993). To jointly test whether the utility parameters 
and scale factors are identical across both checkoff types, the pooled model is also 
estimated: 
This assumption is necessary. Since the budget shares for ADV, RES, and OTHER must sum to one, including an  inter- 
cept would introduce perfect collinearity in the explanatory variables. 80  April2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
The assumption of  an extreme-value distribution for the error term leads to the 
standard conditional logit model that can be estimated through maximum likelihood as 
described in Greene (1997). For example, if t refers to an observation, and q,i  = 1  only 
if option i is chosen and zero otherwise  (i can equal 1,2,  or 3 for the first checkoff, second 
checkoff, and neither, respectively), then the maximum-likelihood function is? 
ma  LLF  =  2  Y,,~  in 
P  t  i=l 
In an effort to be conservative, unless noted otherwise, all results are based on cali- 
brated data. Thus, implicit in the results is an assumption about respondent behavior. 
The assumption is that  respondents will not donate to a checkoff just because they state 
they will; they must also indicate a certainty level of  eight or higher. 
Model estimation using a likelihood-ratio test for the null hypothesis that P = PI = P, 
yields ap-value of  10%. This implies that if a 5% confidence level is used, one would not 
reject the null hypothesis, but at a 10% confidence level the null hypothesis would be 
rejected. Thus, the difference in the preference profile between state and federal check- 
offs is only marginally significant, so the remainder of  this paper pools the state and 
federal checkoff data and estimates a single utility function for both. The main results 
change only slightly if  different utility functions are estimated for both checkoffs. To 
view this study's results disaggregated across state and federal checkoffs, or how results 
change when data are not calibrated, see Winn (2004) and Winn et al. (2004). 
The pooled data are used to answer three questions: (a)  How should a voluntary 
checkoff be designed? (b)  What rate of participation should we expect from a voluntary 
checkoff? and (c) How does the TLP perform at  increasing donation rates? A quick look 
at  a simple linear utility model (which is not a linear probability model) provides initial 
insights into these questions, although a more flexible model will be utilized for better 
results later. The linear model estimate is provided due to its  ease of interpretation. The 
linear utility model estimates (table 2) reveal all attributes are important to producers, 
as determined by the significant coefficients. The negative sign on FEE indicates that 
over the range of FEE in the survey, producers generally preferred a smaller FEE. 
However, a subsequent, more flexible model will show that  FEE actually has a positive 
effect on utility at  lower levels. The positive sign on ADV, in contrast to the negative 
signs on RES and OTHER, indicates producers prefer checkoff funds to focus mostly on 
advertising. 
The signs on RES and OTHER should not be interpreted to imply expenditures in 
these categories detract from utility, as a more flexible model could discover an interior 
solution for RES  or OTHER. Producers respond to the threshold level of provision (TLP) 
by increasing their willingness to donate, as shown by the significant coefficient on TLP 
Other, more flexible models were estimated, including a mixed logit where all the utility parameters were both random 
and correlated with one another. This approach allows a flexible utility and error structure that permits preferences to be 
correlated within surveys. However, because  the mixed logit did not produce substantially  different results, requires reporting 
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Table 2. Parameter  Estimates from Conditional-Logit  Models Using Calibrated 
Data 
Variable 
Linear Utility Function  Flexible Utility Function 
Parameter  Test-  Parameter  Test- 











FEE  * TLP 
Log-Likelihood Function Value  -  1,178.03  -1,152.16 
Sample Size  1,278  1,278 
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*) denote significance at the lo%,  5%,  and 1%  levels, respectively. 
in table 2. This result supports previous fmdings (Messer, Kaiser, and Schulze, 2004; 
Messer, Schmidt, and Kaiser, 2005), where subjects increased donations toward public 
goods in an experimental setting when TLPs were used. 
Next, the following more flexible model is used to better portray producer checkoff 
preferences: 
As before, utility from not donating to any checkoff equals the random error ci. Each 
variable enters the utility function in a quadratic form due to the expectation that pro- 
ducers may prefer an interior solution for some variables. For example, producers likely 
believe that a FEE consisting of a few cents will do little good, but also have a limit on 
how high FEE should be. While coefficients associated with prices are typically expected 
to be negative, such is not the case with checkoffs. In a checkoff, FEE is an investment 
which yields a return. So long as  producers wish to make this investment, FEE will have 
a positive impact on utility at  some level. 
If one designs a checkoff to maximize the linear utility function in table 1,100%  of the 
funds would be devoted toward advertising. However, it is possible that producers want 
a majority, but not all funds, focused on advertising. Since the current checkoff funds 
all three activities (advertising, research, and other), producers would be expected to 
prefer some amount spent on each. Quadratic terms for each budget category allow for 
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Producers may not want a provision point mechanism. Instead, they may want the 
TLP set close to loo%, or they may desire a more balanced TLP such as the 70-90% 
range that was successful in the Messer, Schmidt, and Kaiser (2005) experiment. To 
allow all three possibilities, the TLP enters utility in a quadratic form as well. Finally, 
it seems plausible that the effect of  TLP on utility may depend on the value of  FEE. 
Producers may wish to invest a larger amount of money in the voluntary checkoff, but 
only if other producers are making the larger investment as  well. The interaction term 
(FEE)  *(TLP) allows for this feature. 
The coefficient estimates of (4),  reported in table 2, suggest the TLP has a quadratic 
effect on utility, which will ultimately lead to an interior solution if the checkoff is 
designed to maximize utility. Of course, the significance of the quadratic effect partially 
depends on the covariance between the TLP parameters, which is not reflected by test- 
statistics. Interpreting the coefficients for the three budget categories (advertising, 
research, and other) is more d=cult  due to the numerous terms and differing  signs. Thus, 
an  optimization routine is employed to help decipher what the  flexibly  utility function esti- 
mates imply for producer preferences. This routine utilizes the flexible utility estimates 
in table 2 to design an optimal voluntary checkoff, using two definitions for optimality. 
In this paper, it is assumed that the goal of  the checkoff is to maximize aggregate 
producer welfare, which will be identical to maximizing participation rates. Since total 
utility equals expected utility  times the number  of  producers, total utility  can be 
maximized by maximizing expected utility. While the survey allows producers to choose 
between two checkoffs or neither checkoff, a real voluntary checkoff entails a choice of 
either donating to a single checkoff or not. If  the utility of donating to a checkoff whose 
attributes are described by the vector X is U = XP  +  E,,  and the utility from not donating 
is U = c0,  the expected utility of the choice for a single producer is: 
plus a constant which is omitted here (Champ, Boyle, and Brown, 2003). Several con- 
straints are needed. First, all checkoff attributes (FEE,  ADV, RES, OTHER, and TLP) 
must be nonnegative. Second, the budget allocation must sum to one, i.e., ADV + RES 
+ OTHER = 1. Third, the actual participation rate must exceed the TLP. Moreover, 
checkoff designers will want to set the TLP with a reasonable certainty it will not be 
violated, so that checkoff activities can continue without interruption. The expected 
participation rate is PR = exp(XP)/ [l  + exp(XP)] (Train, 2003). Notice that maximizing 
the participation rate is the same as maximizing (5). Using the delta method, the vari- 
ance of this participation rate is [VPRI  v(D)  [VPR'I ,  where VPR is the  gradient of PR with 
respect to p. The optimization routine is programmed to ensure that the expected 
participation rate minus three standard deviations exceeds the  value of TLP. These 
constraints lead to the following optimization problem: 
max E(U) = ln{l + exp(~P)); 
X 
FEE, ADV, RES, OTHER, TLP 2 0; 
ADV + RES + OTHER  = 1; 
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Table 3. Utility-Maximizing  Checkoff Design 
Checkoff Attribute 
Optimal  Standard 
Checkoff Attribute  a  Deviation 
Checkoff Fee (FEE)  $0.7l/head  ($0.08) 
Percent of Budget Allocated to:  .  Advertising (ADV)  69%  (6%)  .  Research (RES)  3%  (5%)  .  Other (OTHER)  29%  (5%) 
Threshold Level of Provision (TLP)  35%  (8%) 
"The point estimate using the parameter estimates in table 2. 
bStandard  deviations are obtained usingsimulations. The utility parameters were simulated from their estimated 
distribution 500 times, and the optimal checkoff was calculated at each simulation. 
Optimization results indicate producers prefer a voluntary fee of approximately $0.70 
per head, with 70% of the funds spent on advertising and 30% spent on other activities 
(table 3). Surprisingly, the optimal solution for research is zero. The utility-maximizing 
threshold provision level is 35%, and will be given greater discussion later. One might 
wonder how this optimal checkoff design would change in repeated samples. Fortun- 
ately, this is easily addressed using simulations. At each simulation, utility parameters 
are simulated assuming a nonnal distribution and using the mean and covariance 
matrix estimated in table 2. After simulating new utility parameters, the optimization 
problem is repeated to yield a new optimal checkoff design. After 1,000 iterations, the 
standard deviation of  each optimal attribute (table 3) can be used to assess how the 
optimal checkoff could change in repeated samples. A histogram of the optimal checkoff 
attributes is provided in figure 1. 
According to the simulation, in repeated samples the optimal advertising budget is 
roughly 60-80%  (two standard deviations below and above the point estimate in table 
3). This finding confirms that producers place a greater priority on advertising. They 
also prefer a fee between $0.60 and $0.80, and place little importance on research. As 
suggested by figure 1,  most of the  time the optimal research allocation is zero. The histo- 
gram also reflects a very low probability of the optimal threshold level of provision (TLP) 
being less than 20%. 
Presumably, producers wish the checkoff to follow the equi-marginal principle as 
described by Cranfield (2003)-i.e.,  the marginal utility of an additional dollar spent on 
each budget category should be equal. Otherwise, a change in the budget allocation 
could yield higher utility. Producers' emphasis on advertising over research and "other" 
suggests they believe that the marginal return evaluated at  any funding level is greater 
for advertising than the other two categories. The simulation also suggests that the 
marginal utility of increasing research expenditures may be zero. 
Performance of the Provision Point Mechanism 
Perhaps the greatest threat to the survival of a voluntary beef checkoff is free-riders. No 
producer will want to bear most of  the checkoff cost when all producers share in its 
benefits. One tool that can potentially control free-riders and enhance contributions is 
a provision point mechanism  (PPM). A PPM establishes a minimal level of  support 
needed before a public good is provided. In this case, the minimum level of support is a 84  April 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
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minimum percentage of  cattle producers who do not request a refund of  their checkoff 
fees, referred to as a threshold level ofprovision (TLP). 
Studies by Messer, Kaiser, and Schulze (2004)  and Messer, Schmidt, and Kaiser (2005) 
(hereafter referred to as  the Messer studies)  have already evaluated the performance of 
TLPs (along with other institutions) in  an experimental setting designed to mimic 
voluntary checkoffs. Under certain conditions, such as  a checkoffbenefit-cost  ratio of 4:1, 
the optimal TLP is 82% and can be expected to be met 76% of  the time. Our study seeks 
to test the performance of  the TLP using a stated preference survey, which differs from 
the experimental settings of  the Messer studies. 
Perhaps the most important difference is that the survey cannot control the checkoff 
benefit-cost ratio. Producers contribute to the checkoff if they believe the ratio high, and 
request a refund if they believe the ratio low. Therefore, the survey results are condi- 
tional on producers' perceptions regarding the benefits and costs of a voluntary checkoff. 
As studies have shown, the benefit-cost ratio can profoundly change the performance of 
a TLP and the optimal TLP value (Messer, Schmidt, and Kaiser, 2005; Rondeau, Poe, 
and Schulze, 1999). The "optimal" TLP value in this study depends on the benefit-cost 
ratio  perceived  by  cattle  producers,  whereas  the benefit-cost  ratio  in  laboratory 
experiments is determined by the researcher. 
As shown in table 3, when the objective is utility maximization, the optimal TLPvalue 
is around 35%, which is significantly lower than the optimal range of  68% to 90% in 
the Messer studies. Numerous reasons can be offered for this low value. Perhaps the 
perceived benefit-cost ratio of a checkoff is lower than the ratio used in the Messer 
experiments. Another reason may be that producers are  not very familiar with the TLP, 
and in a single survey did not give it  much thought. Compare this to the Messer studies Nonvood et al.  Designing a Voluntaly Beef Checkoff  85 
Threshold Provision Level 
Note:  The values of FEE, ADV,  and OTHER  are set 
at  their utility-maximizing level as  given by table 3. 
Figure 2. Relationship between threshold level 
of provision (TLP)  and participation rate 
where the TLP was carefully explained to subjects verbatim, and subjects were given 
practice with the TLP before the experiment began. 
Some may argue that since the quadratic term on TLP is not significant, there may 
not be an  interior solution. In fact, there is a valid reason for believing the optimal TLP 
value to be zero. Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the TLP on participation rates. Only 
at  low TLP values of 35% or less can one be confident the TLP  will be met. At high TLP 
values (above 60%)  like those in the Messer studies, the TLP will almost certainly be 
violated, because the projected participation rate is lower than the  TLP.  Also, in the next 
section, we show that participation rates do not fall dramatically when the provision 
point mechanism is eliminated. Although the TLP did not perform as well at limiting 
free-riders in this study as  in the Messer studies, the survey results clearly show that 
producers respond to the TLP by increasing their propensity to donate. Combining this 
finding with the results of the Messer studies, we can conclude provision point mechan- 
isms are a useful tool for limiting free-riders. 
Had a voluntary checkoff been initiated and checkoff administrators considered using 
TLPs, two important features should be noted. The confidence interval in figure 2 is 
calculated based on the assumption that sampling variability is  the only uncertainty. In 
reality, there is model uncertainty, as  well as  heterogeneity across producers in different 
regions. These will widen the confidence intervals,  increase the chance of having to cease 
checkoff activities, and issue full donations even at  low TLP levels. Second,  note that the 
function in figure 2 has a small slope. An increase in the TLP (when TLP is below 80%) 
increases participation, but only slightly. In fact, it appears participation is not much 
lower at a TLP of  5%  (reasonably low to approximate a checkoff without a TLP) 
compared to its optimal level of  35%. Checkoff administrators may feel the gain in 
participation due to the use of  a TLP does not outweigh the risks TLPs entail, such as 
having to cease checkoff activities and issuing full refunds to producers. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Projected Participation Rates 
If avoluntary  checkoff were warranted, what percentage of producers would contribute? 
Donation rates will depend partially on how the checkoff is designed. As discussed pre- 
viously, producer participation is maximized by  the checkoff design, as given by the 
second column of table 3. However, administrators may feel a more equitable budget 
allocation across advertising, research, and other will yield greater long-term benefits. 
Specifically, they may feel more qualified to identify the proper budget allocation than 
the average producer. If they are right, a budget allocation that differs from the one in 
table 3 may deliver more long-term benefits and elicit higher future participation rates. 
But how would initial participation rates fall if a checkoff design differed from the 
presentation in table 3? And what if checkoff administrators feel the risks inherent in 
a provision point mechanism are not worth the benefits? Will participation rates fall 
slightly or dramatically? This section seeks to answer these questions. 
As described earlier, the  percentage of producers who will willingly donate to avolun- 
tary checkoff can be estimated as follows: 
where X is a vector of checkoff design attributes and P is the utility parameter vector 
from the model in equation (4)  (Train, 2003). Variations in participation rates can then 
be studied by varying the checkoff design characteristics in X. 
Recall survey responses are calibrated using a certainty question, and the literature 
suggests  this  will result in an  underestimation of participation rates. The literature also 
suggests if the results are repeated using uncalibrated data, participation rates will be 
overestimated. This provides an opportunity to use both calibrated and uncalibrated 
data to obtain a lower and upper bound to true participation rates. 
The calibrated rates are estimated using the flexible utility model estimates in table 
2, and evaluating the participation rates at alternative specifications for the checkoff 
design matrix X. The uncalibrated rates are obtained by reestimating (4) using 
uncalibrated data. Participation rates under various checkoff designs are shown in 
table 4. All participation rates in the same column (rates  using calibrated or uncali- 
brated data)  are significantly different from one another as  indicated by bootstraps 
(see the footnote to table 4). First, consider participation under the utility-maximizing 
checkoff. The lower and upper bounds are 46% and 69%, respectively. This suggests 
that, as a best guess, under the best conditions participation would be a little more 
than 50%. 
Starting  from the utility-maximizing checkoff design, if the threshold level of provi- 
sion (TLP) is decreased from 35% to 5%, the lower and upper bounds fall by 11 and 14 
percentage points, respectively. The participation rate in the absence of a TLP cannot 
be estimated directly, because the lowest TLP in the surveys is 5%. However, readers 
may feel a 5% TLP is sufficiently low to approximate a checkoff without a provision 
point mechanism. These readers can use table 4 to infer that the provision point 
mechanism used here will increase participation, but the increase will probably not 
exceed 15%.  Deviating from the optimal budget allocation to an  equal budget allocation 
decreases participation-it  must do so by model construction-by  about 10 percentage 
points (compare alternatives A and B in table 4). Nomood et al.  Designing a Voluntary Beef Checkoff  87 
Table 4. Projected Voluntary Checkoff Donation Rates 
Lower Bound Using  Upper Bound Using 
Calibrated Data  Uncalibrated Data 
Projected  Std.  Projected  Std. 
Checkoff Design  Participation Rate  Dev.  Participation Rate  Dev. 
Utility-Maximizing Checkoff Design:  46%  (4%)  69%  (3%) 
FEE = 0.72; ADV = 0.7; RES = 0.0; 
OTHER = 0.3; TLP = 0.35 
Alternative A Checkoff Design:  35%  (5%)  55%  (5%) 
FEE = 0.72; ADV = 0.7; RES = 0.0; 
OTHER = 0.3;  TLP = 0.05 
Alternative B Checkoff Design:  24%  (4%)  45  %  (5%) 
FEE = 0.72; ADV = ll3; RES = ll3; 
OTHER = ll3; TLP = 0.05 
Notes: All participation rates under column two are statistically different from one another, and so are the rates under 
column three. Statistical significance is evaluated by simulating the utility parameters  from their estimatingdistribution 
and calculating the participation rates under each simulated utility. The participation rates under each checkoff  design 
are subtracted from one another, and the percentage of times this term is positive or negative is calculated as ap-value 
to the null hypothesis that  the rates are identical. The standard deviation of each rate is calculated  by taking the standard 
deviation of each rate in the simulations. A total of 500 simulations are used. 
Summary and Additional Comments 
If the  Supreme Court had ruled the  beef checkoff violates the  First  Amendment, the  beef 
industry was poised to initiate voluntary checkoffs across numerous states. This study 
sought information from Oklahoma cattle producers on how to best design voluntary 
checkoffs, to assess the ability of  a provision point mechanism to limit free-riders, and 
to predict donation rates across producers. While it  now appears the  mandatory checkoff 
will remain in place, these survey results are still important. Checkoff opponents will 
likely continue to seek to abolish mandatory fees imposed by the current checkoff. If 
successful, checkoff administrators will have the following results readily available to 
aid in implementation of a voluntary checkoff. 
Oklahoma cattle  producer preferences for how voluntary checkoffs are  designed differ 
little for state-level or nationwide checkoffs. Advertising should take greatest priority 
and should comprise around 70% of the checkoff budget, with "other activities" (consumer 
education, export promotion) being of second importance. If checkoff money is spent on 
research, it should probably not exceed 10%. If the voluntary fee and budget allocation 
are set to maximize producer utility, roughly 46%-69% of producers will not request 
that their checkoff fee be refunded. 
However, this participation rate may increase, perhaps greatly, in the presence of a 
status-quo bias induced by the refundable nature of a voluntary beef checkoff. A volun- 
tary checkoff will likely collect fees from all producers, returning the fee if the producer 
requests. Producers will be more likely to contribute if they must ask for money back, 
rather than give up money voluntarily (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991). The 
survey used in this study does not contain this bias because it is hypothetical and no 
money is initially taken. Although the  checkoff is described as a refundable checkoff, the 
status-quo bias will not exist unless real money is taken. 88  April2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Experiments by Messer, Kaiser, and Schulze (2004) show this status-quo bias can be 
large. In their study,  when mimicking voluntary checkoffs without a refund mechanism, 
contribution rates are approximately 50%, which is within the range estimated here.7 
But when the refund mechanism was introduced, contribution rates increased to 85%, 
which is outside the range estimated here but consistent with the participation rates 
experienced in some  voluntary wheat checkoffs (Lyford,  Tilley, and Carlberg, 2003). This 
suggests that the feasibility of a voluntary beef checkoff may depend crucially on the 
refund mechanism and the status-quo bias it creates. 
Survey results also provide information on a tool touted to minimize free-riding-the 
threshold level of provision (TLP).  The TLP often experiences success in the laboratory, 
even those experiments mimicking a voluntary checkoff. However, while producers 
responded to the TLP by increasing their propensity to donate, the response was small, 
and a voluntary checkoff could arguably stand a better chance of  surviving without a 
TLP. 
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Appendix: 
Sample Survey 
This survey asks your opinion on a hypothetical voluntary beef checkoff. We  are interested  in your 
input. Please read the following information before answering the questions. 
We would like you to consider a hypothetical  voluntary checkoff. This is a potential checkoff that might emerge 
if the current checkoff is eliminated. The voluntary checkoff would be implemented as follows: 
r  Checkoff funds would be collected as a fee per head sold for all cattle sold-just  as they are now. 
Any producer may request for his or her checkoff fees to be refunded in full. 
b  Collections remaining after refunds would then be spent on checkoff programs (e.g.,  generic advertising 
and promotion, beef safety research, etc.). 
b  However, if  a minimum  participation rate is not met, all producers will  receive  a full refund- 
regardless of  whether they requested the refund. The minimum participation rate is defined as a 
percent of producers who do  not request a refund. For example, if the minimum participation rate 
is 60%,  but only 40% of  producers do not request a refund, all producers will receive a full refund. 
Below are three options. Options A and B represent different voluntary checkoffs you could participate in by 
not requesting your refund. If you would request a refund instead of  participating in Options A or B, please 
choose Option C. 90  April 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
(1)  Please check the ONE  option from the table below you prefer the most if this were a 
NATIONWIDE voluntary beef checkoff, assuming these are  the only options available. These are 
hypothetical  checkoffs, and studies have  found that people overstate their willingness  to 
participate in hypothetical situations. Before answering, please think hard about the choice you 
would make if it involved real money. 
*Other activities include export promotion, industry information, consumer education, and personal communications. 
Ifyou chose OptionsA  or  B in Question 1,  please answer the  fillowing question (ifyou  chose Option 
C, please continue to Question 3). 
OP~ION  C 
Neither A nor B is 
preferred. If these 
were the only two 
options available, I 
would request my 
checkoff fees be 
refunded in full. 
I choose neither 
A nor B. I would 
request a refund 
(2)  On a scale of 1  to 10, where 1  means "very uncertain" and 10 means ''very certain," how certain are you 
that  you would voluntarily pay the checkofffee for the  option you chose in Question 1  if given the opportunity? 
(CIRCLE ONE NUMBER) 






I choose Option B 
and would not 
request a refund 
CHECKOFF  ATTRIBUTE 
Checkoff Fee 
Minimum Participation Rate 
Percent of Funds Spent on 
Advertising and Promotion 
Percent of Funds Spent on 
Research 
Percent of Funds Spent on Other 
Activities* 
I would choose (please check 
ONLY ONE OPTION): 
12345678910 
very  very 
uncertain  certain 






I choose Option A 
and would not 
request a refund 
(3)  We  would  like you  to now check the ONE  option you  prefer the most if  this was an 
OZUA€IOMA voluntary beef checkoff, where contributions are collected only in Oklahoma and a 
board of  Oklahoma cattle producers determines how the funds are spent. Assume there is no 
nationwide voluntary checkoff, and that these are  the only options available. Again, please think 
carefully about your answer and respond as if you were contributing real money. 
*Other activities include export promotion, industry information, consumer education, and personal communications. 
CHECKOFF  ATTRIBUTE 
Checkoff Fee 
Minimum Participation Rate 
Percent of Funds Spent on 
Advertising and Promotion 
Percent of Funds Spent on 
Research 
Percent ofFunds Spent on Other 
Activities* 
I would choose (please check 
ONLY ONE OPTION): 
OPTION  C 
Neither A nor B is 
preferred. If these 
were the only two 
options available, I 
would request my 
checkoff fees be 
refunded in full. 
I choose neither 
A nor B. I would 
request a refund 






I choose Option A 
and  would not 
request a refund 






I choose Option B 
and would not 
request a refund Nonvood et al.  Designing a Voluntary  Beef Checkoff  91 
Ifyou chose Options  A or B in Question 3, please answer the fillowing question (ifyou  chose Option 
C, please continue to Question 5). 
(4)  On a scale of 1  to 10,  where 1  means "very uncertainn and 10  means "very certain," how certain are you 
that you would voluntarily pay the checkoff fee for the option you chose in  Question 3 if given the opportunity? 
(CIRCLE ONE NUMBER) 
12345678910 
very  very 
uncertain  certain 
Please describe your cattle operation and views on the beef checkoff by answering the following 
questions. 
(5)  In the boxes below, please indicate the average number of cattle and calves you sell each year. 
Average number of weaned calves sold per year: 
none  less than 50  50-99  100-199  200-499  500 or greater 
Average number of feeder cattle sold per year: 
none  less than 100  100499  500-999  1,000-4,999  5,000 or greater 
Average number of fed cattle sold per year: 
none  less than 500  500-999  1,000-9,999  10,000-19,999  20,000 or greater 
Average number of veal calves sold per year: 
none  less than 50  50-99  100-199  200499  500 or greater 
Average number of purebred heifers and bulls sold per year: 
none  less than 50  50-99  100-199  200-499  500 or greater 
(6)  Do you raise beef or dairy cattle? 
beef breeds only  dairy breeds only  both beef and dairy breeds 
(7) Please check any farm organizations in which you are  a member: 
Oklahoma Cattlemen's Association  National Farmers Union 
National Cattlemen's Beef Association  Oklahoma Farm Bureau Association 
R-Calf USA  American Farm Bureau Association 
Other (please list) 
(8)  Were you aware  of the  recent litigation and  court rulings on the  beef checkoff before receiving this survey? 
Yes  No 
(9)  Which best describes your feelings toward the challenge to the mandatory beef checkoff? 
I am in favor of eliminating the mandatory beef checkoff. 
I am in favor of keeping the mandatory beef checkoff. 
Undecided 
(10) Who, in  your opinion, receives the greatest benefit from checkoff funds spent on advertising? 
Cattle producers  Cattle producers and processors and retailers benefit equally 
Beef processors and retailers  Undecided 
(11) Who, in your opinion, receives the greatest benefit from checkoff funds spent on research? 
Cattle producers  Cattle producers and processors and retailers benefit equally 
Beef processors and retailers  Undecided 92  April2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
(12) How much do you feel the beef checkoff funds benefit cattle and beef producers outside of the US.? 
more than U.S. producers  less than U.S. producers 
equal to U.S. producers  other or not sure 
(13) Please estimate your household's  yearly income before taxes by checking the appropriate box. This 
question is used to ensure our sample is  representative of all producers. Please remember that  your responses 
are anonymous and will be held strictly confidential. 
less than $20,000  $60,000-$79,999 
$20,000-$39,999  $80,000  or greater 
$40,000-$59,999 
(14) Do you have any comments you would like to add? If so, please list them below. 